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1 
Abstract 1 
Objective: Develop and investigate the potential of a remote, computer mediated and 2 
synchronous text-based triage, which we refer to as InSort, for quickly highlighting persons 3 
of interest after an insider attack. 4 
Background: Insiders maliciously exploit legitimate access to impair the confidentiality and 5 
integrity of organizations. The globalisation of organisations and advancement of information 6 
technology means employees are often dispersed across national and international sites, 7 
working around the clock, often remotely. Hence, investigating insider attacks is challenging. 8 
However, the cognitive demands associated with masking insider activity offer opportunities. 9 
Drawing on cognitive approaches to deception and understanding of deception-conveying 10 
features in textual responses we developed InSort, a remote computer mediated triage. 11 
Method: During a 6-hour immersive simulation, participants worked in teams, examining 12 
password protected, security sensitive databases and exchanging information during an 13 
organized crime investigation. Twenty-five percent were covertly incentivized to act as an 14 
‘insider’ by providing information to a provocateur. 15 
Results: Responses to InSort questioning revealed insiders took longer to answer 16 
investigation relevant questions, provided impoverished responses, and their answers were 17 
less consistent with known evidence about their behaviors than co-workers. 18 
Conclusion: Findings demonstrate InSort has potential to expedite information gathering and 19 
investigative processes following an insider attack. 20 
Application: InSort is appropriate for application by non-specialist investigators and can be 21 
quickly altered as a function of both environment and event. InSort offers a clearly defined, 22 
well specified, approach for use across insider incidents, and highlights the potential of 23 
technology for supporting complex time critical investigations. 24 
 25 
Page 8 of 40
For Review Puposes Only
Submitted to Human Factors
Computer-mediated triage insider attacks 
 
 
2 
Precis 26 
Insiders exploit legitimate access to negatively affect organizations. Drawing on cognitive 27 
approaches to deception and understanding of deception-conveying features in textual 28 
responses we combined these literatures to develop ‘InSort’, a novel, remote computer-29 
mediated triage. Findings suggest InSort has potential to triage persons of interest from co-30 
workers following an attack, thereby expediting the initial investigative process. 31 
  32 
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3 
Introduction 33 
Insiders exploit privileged access to damage organizations (see Mills et al., 2017; Posey et 34 
al., 2013). Examples include a BUPA employee who downloaded and offered for sale 35 
547,000 items of patient information and a NASA employee who downloaded classified 36 
national defence information. Insider crime is increasing (Homoliak et al., 2019; Clearswift 37 
Insider Threat Index, 2017) and becoming more expensive (European Union Agency for 38 
Cybersecurity, 2020; National Law Review, 2020). Surveys suggest 27% of cybercrime 39 
incidents are committed by insiders (Trzeciak, 2019) with insiders responsible for 43% of 40 
data loss reported by the world’s largest companies (Intel Security, 2015). Insider threats are 41 
difficult to mitigate. Employees are trusted, with detailed knowledge and access to employer 42 
assets. Understanding of insider behaviours and psychological characteristics is improving 43 
(e.g., Costa, et al., 2016; Elmrabit et al., 2020; Greitzer et al., 2018; Spitzner, 2003; Taylor et 44 
al., 2013). However, few insider investigative techniques exist (Maybury, 2006) because 45 
knowledge derived from one attack is not necessarily relevant to others (e.g., CPNI, 2020; 46 
Saxena et al., 2020). 47 
Computer-Mediated Triage 48 
Gathering post attack information is fundamental to understanding what has 49 
happened. In doing so, investigators (in-house security or external agencies) seek to 50 
understand the veracity of employee accounts. Employees may be dispersed across numerous 51 
national or international sites and so conducting timely and effective investigations can be 52 
challenging. Here, we evaluate text-based computer mediated communication (CMC) using a 53 
series of event-specific questions towards meeting this challenge. CMC screening is 54 
increasingly used to support decision-making where there are high volumes of traffic such as 55 
for pre-screening job applicants and completing employee credibility assessments (Jenson et 56 
al., 2010; Tyman et al., 2014). Building on research concerning the language of insiders 57 
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4 
(Jenkins & Dando, 2011; Taylor et al., 2013), we investigated whether synchronous textual 58 
responses to CMC questions might effectively triage persons of interest. 59 
CMC has several potential advantages. Organizations can gather information from 60 
employees simultaneously, irrespective of location, offering speed, volume, and reach (e.g., 61 
Lew et al., 2018; Pang et al., 2018; Yao & Ling, 2020). Text-based CMC is widely 62 
accessible, technically stable and is low in media richness and so devoid of non-verbal cues 63 
that occur during face-to-face interactions that can negatively impact investigations, 64 
potentially reducing false positives and negatives (e.g., Bond & DePaulo, 2006; Dando & 65 
Ormerod, 2017; Is baster & Nass, 2000; Markowitz , 2020; Matsumoto et al., 2011; Meissner 66 
& Lyles, 2019; Nortje & Tredoux, 2019; ; Walsh et al., 2018).  67 
Masking Malicious Behaviour 68 
Psychological knowledge of the challenges of masking malicious activity offers 69 
strategic insight into how to structure a CMC triage. To remain above suspicion necessitates 70 
deceiving colleagues (e.g., Homoliak et al, 2019; Lew et al., 2018; Taylor et al., 2013). 71 
Hence, insiders have an impression management goal (Colwell et al., 2006; Weiss et al., 72 
2006). They have to provide deceptive accounts that appear truthful and so have to manage 73 
‘two employment worlds’: tasks they should and should not have completed. Hence, 74 
providing a convincing false account is more demanding than completing legitimate activity 75 
and then providing a truthful account. This disparity offers opportunities for detection (e.g., 76 
Colwell et al., 2007; Kohan et al., 2020; Vrij et al., 2017).  77 
Increased cognitive load in such circumstances (e.g., Bhatt et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 78 
2015) can result in differential verbal behaviours between liars and truthtellers. Liars often 79 
provide less consistent or coherent verbal accounts lacking informational content, with fewer 80 
event details (Boggard et al., 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig et al. 2011). Differences 81 
can be enhanced by tactical questioning techniques (e.g., Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2014; Dando 82 
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& Bull, 2011; Dando & Ormerod, 2020; Hamlin et al., 2020; Ormerod & Dando, 2015; 83 
Sporer, 2016; Vrij et al., 2010), which have yielded over 70% accuracy where the base rate of 84 
deceivers was just 1:1000 (Dando & Ormerod, 2020; Ormerod & Dando, 2015), compared 85 
with a typical detection rate of 54% (e.g., Bond & dePaulo, 2006; Hauch et al., 2016). Similar 86 
results are reported in laboratory-based research (e.g., Dando & Bull, 2011; Granhag & 87 
Hartwig, 2015; Levine, 2014; Sandham et al., 2020).  88 
Detecting deception via tactical questioning is largely situated in face-to-face and 89 
media-rich interview contexts. Nonetheless, several techniques lend themselves to CMC 90 
triage with potential for leveraging measurable indicators of deception (Lee et al., 2009; Zhou 91 
et al., 2002), particularly where comparisons can be made across employee responses 92 
gathered following each insider attack (Burgoon et al., 2003; Rubin et al., 2015). For 93 
example, deception-conveying features can sometimes include wordy replies with low 94 
information (e.g., Pollina et al., 2017; Vendemia et al., 2005) and more expressions of 95 
uncertainty (Zhou et al., 2002).  96 
Towards a Solution      97 
Combining cognitive approaches to deception and understanding of deception-98 
conveying features in textual responses, we developed a novel CMC text-based triage: InSort 99 
(Insider Sort). InSort comprised a series of bespoke questions dictated by the insider event 100 
itself, the run-up to the event, and workers day-to-day work activities (e.g., necessary, 101 
unnecessary, and not allowed). Additionally, various questioning strategies were employed. 102 
Target questions concern attack-specific behaviours, including behaviours in the run up to an 103 
attack, questions about attempted access to databases, physical movements, and 104 
communication. Target questioning increases cognitive complexity for insiders to maximize 105 
the collection of triage-relevant information. Open questions (tell, explain, describe) gather 106 
accounts about specific times, necessitating provision of expansive answers. These question 107 
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6 
types and their tactical presentation makes it challenging for insiders to provide a coherent 108 
account (e.g., Dando & Ormerod, 2020; Dando & Bull 2011; Ormerod & Dando, 2015).  109 
Target questions are manipulated to impose high cognitive demands on liars. They are 110 
not presented en bloc nor chronologically, thereby introducing a temporal element (requiring 111 
maintenance of six worlds – true and false versions of past, present and future). Some target 112 
questions are repeated, accentuating between-question inconsistencies and contradictions, 113 
which can be indicative of deceit (Blair et al., 2018; Chan & Bull, 2014; Vredeveldt et al. 114 
2014). Responses are required before moving to the next question. Thus, InSort is interactive 115 
(e.g., Lee et al., 2009; Sánchez-Junquera et al., 2020; Zhou et al., 2003), demanding higher 116 
levels of cognitive engagement (Burgoon et al., 2010). The immediacy of InSort reduces 117 
opportunities to construct deceptive accounts or confer with accomplices versus lengthier 118 
triage processes conducted by human investigators (Levine & Blair, 2018; Walczyk et al., 119 
2013).  120 
In sum, InSort may confer advantages including speed of implementation and 121 
increased concurrent cognitive demand for insiders (deceivers), which may leverage 122 
deception-conveying features (e.g., Bhatt et al., 2009; Jiang et al., 2015). We conducted a 123 
‘serious gaming’ empirical study, whereby participants were immersed in a full-day office-124 
based collaborative investigations of organized crime. The game, known as Confidential 125 
Operations Simulation (iCOS: see Taylor et al., 2013), was played over a series of 126 
competitive rounds. To establish a behavioural baseline, the first round was played with no 127 
insider. In subsequent rounds, team members were assigned the role of ‘insider’, receiving 128 
financial incentives to undertake illicit activities and not to be caught (see Method). The 129 
study tested a series of hypotheses:  130 
• Insiders will take significantly longer than non-insiders to complete InSort (H1) because 131 
of the dual impacts of tactical questioning and limited time to develop lie scripts.  132 
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7 
• Impression management will result in insider’s text responses to open target questions 133 
being shorter and with less information than non-insiders (H2). 134 
• Insiders will be less consistent in their responses to closed target questions , making 135 
answer-evidence errors (H3).   136 
• Insiders will report finding InSort cognitively demanding and will be less confident in 137 
their responses (H4).  138 
 139 
Method 140 
 141 
Participants and Procedure  142 
 143 
Sixty participants were paid £50 to take part in iCOS games lasting between 6 and 9 144 
hours (M = 6.8 hours) - 26 males (Mage = 25.67, range 18 to 40 years), and 34 females (Mage = 145 
23.8 years, range 19 to 30 years).  Each game was split into four rounds and comprised 12 146 
players, randomly assigned to a team (i) Fraud; (ii) Human Trafficking; and (iii) Narcotics. 147 
Each team comprised four roles: Administrator, Field Agent, Intelligence Analyst and 148 
Tactical Investigator. Status and responsibilities within teams were equal.   149 
Teams had to solve a series of linked crimes, one in each round. Teams were 150 
presented with intelligence updates about criminal gangs and used this information to guide 151 
their searches of password-protected databases. Team players pieced together information to 152 
identify gang members and their location. Players’ database access was limited, so team 153 
members worked together, exchanging information, recognizing connections across 154 
databases, and engaging in collaborative problem solving. The team that most quickly 155 
identified and located criminals ‘won’. Teams were financially incentivized to win each 156 
round (an additional £20 for winning the round). Each round lasted approximately ninety 157 
minutes including regular breaks.  158 
At the start, participants were randomly assigned to a team role. They received 159 
instructions about the tasks to be completed, training on using the investigative databases, 160 
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8 
and familiarized themselves with the databases. To simulate a secure environment, players 161 
worked in ‘silent’ offices, making notes using desktop publishing and spreadsheet software 162 
and exchanging information using email, SMS messaging and mobile phone conversations. 163 
They had access to a printer in a separate room. Once familiar with the environment, one 164 
team member received instructions about the first crime to be investigated. All further 165 
interaction with participants was conducted via email with ‘Gold Command’ (a confederate). 166 
Gold Command issued instructions for subsequent tasks. By embedding task instructions into 167 
the simulation, we hoped to enhance participants’ immersion in the simulation (Druckman, 168 
2005).  169 
Prior to the second round (at the end of the first round), up to two players in each 170 
team were covertly approached to provide information to a provocateur for an additional £20 171 
reward. Specifically, to obtain information concerning an individual under investigation, and 172 
to email this information to the provocateur. The approach occurred face-to-face, out of sight 173 
of the other participants. The same participants were again covertly invited to complete 174 
further acts in the third and fourth rounds for an additional £20 each time. They were 175 
instructed to develop their own method for completing the insider task to avoid raising 176 
suspicion of teammates. All participants approached agreed to the insider task. The multiple 177 
teams and sequence of rounds provided insiders numerous opportunities to complete their 178 
tasks. For example, they could develop friendships with members of other teams for 179 
malicious information gathering or distribute their activity across multiple periods to make it 180 
more difficult to spot patterns of activity. Similarly, breaks taken by co-workers afforded 181 
opportunities for players to compromise security.  182 
Investigative tasks increased in complexity throughout the game. Similarly, the 183 
insider task increased in complexity. In round 2, insiders were instructed to retrieve 184 
information from a database they had legitimate access to but which was irrelevant to their 185 
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9 
team’s intelligence task. In round 3, to provide information from a database only legitimately 186 
accessible by another team member. In round 4, to gather information from a database that 187 
was only accessible by members of another team. Once the game was complete, players were 188 
informed that there had been a security breech, and that their behaviour during the simulation 189 
would investigated. Each participant was then required to individually complete InSort. All 190 
insiders completed each of the insider tasks set.  191 
Materials 192 
The iCOS software comprised five primary modules: a password-protected database 193 
creation module, a player interface, a data/keystroke capture module, an investigator 194 
interface, and a game configuration module. The software provided an ‘electronic’ footprint 195 
of activities undertaken by each player, including searches of particular databases, use of 196 
email, use of internet, and use of printer for each system user. Footprint data and 197 
communication data were used to verify participants’ answers to InSort questions. Players 198 
were informed that because they were working in a security sensitive environment they were 199 
being monitored at all times. This included digital video recording, keystroke data, and 200 
monitoring mobile phone usage (text and voice).   201 
InSort comprised 56 questions, of which 16 were repeated (example questions see 202 
appendix A):  203 
• Two questions collected information regarding team membership and role, answered 204 
via a drop-down menu. 205 
• One question asked participants to indicate which databases they had access to as a 206 
function of their role and team, again via a drop-down menu.  207 
• Three open target questions invited textual responses regarding incident-specific 208 
duties, communications activity and movements around the office including access to 209 
the printer room and printing activity. 210 
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10 
• Eight forced-choice yes/no questions concerned password security and adherence to 211 
iCOS rules and regulations regarding data security. 212 
The following yes/no questions were repeated twice, randomly throughout the InSort 213 
interview: 214 
• Four related to access to each of the four databases.  215 
• Four concerned attempted (but unsuccessful) access to each of the four databases. 216 
Four concerned mobile phone usage (1), SMS messaging (1), emailing documents (1), 217 
and email behaviour (1). 218 
• Four questions concerned visiting the meeting room, meeting other players, visiting 219 
the printer room, and printer use. 220 
Participants received instructions on completing InSort, after which they logged in 221 
using a unique identifier. Participants could only move forwards through InSort and were 222 
unable to skip questions. On completion, participants provided feedback regarding player 223 
strategies, behaviours and perceptions of InSort via a hard copy questionnaire comprising 10 224 
questions with Likert scale (ranging from 1 to 5) or yes/no responses. 225 
This research complied with the American Psychological Association Code of Ethics 226 
and was approved by the Lancaster University Institutional Review Board. Informed consent 227 
was obtained from each participant (materials are available from the first author).  228 
Results  229 
Duration (H1). Two-way ANOVAs revealed a significant main effect of group 230 
(insider, non-insider) , F(1, 54) = 187.81 p < .001, ηp2 = 0.88. Insiders took twice as long to 231 
complete InSort (M = 696s, SD = 120.28, 95% CI, 626.62; 765.52) than non-insiders (M = 232 
340s, SD =  79.37, 95% CI, 316.15; 363.29). Main effects of team (Narcotics, Fraud, 233 
Trafficking) and team role (Administrator, Field Agent, Intelligence Analyst, Tactical 234 
Investigator) and all interactions were non-significant, as were the all Fs < 0.35, all ps > .097. 235 
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 Word count and information content (H2).  Two-way ANOVAs revealed  a 236 
significant main effect of group (insider, non-insider) for the total number of words in 237 
response to each open target questions, F(1, 36) = 12.866, p = .001, ηp 2 = 0.26, and F(1, 36) 238 
= 23.95, p < .001, ηp 2 = 0.40, respectively (see Fig. 1). Non-insiders wrote three times more 239 
words (SD = 10.67) than insiders (SD = 2.21) for OQ1 and 2.5 more words (SD = 18.43) for 240 
OQ2 than insiders (SD = 8.40). Main effects of team (Narcotics, Fraud, Trafficking) and 241 
team role (Administrator, Field Agent, Intelligence Analyst, Tactical Investigator) were non-242 
significant, as were all interactions, all ps > .554 (see Table 1). OQ3 was only available to 243 
participants who responded ‘yes’ to questions concerning printer usage, emailing documents 244 
for printing and visiting the printer room. Accordingly, 25 participants responded to OQ3, of 245 
which seven were insiders (50% of insiders; 30% of non-insiders). A one-way ANOVA 246 
revealed no significant difference between insiders and non-insiders for total word count in 247 
response to OQ3, p = .894 (see Fig. 1). 248 
 249 
Figure 1. 250 
Mean word count for each of open question (OQ1, OQ2 and OQ3) as a function of group 251 
(insider; non-insider). 252 
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 253 
 254 
Information items in response to open target questions (OQ1, OQ2 and OQ3) were 255 
calculated by summing the number of correct, discrete, quantifiable investigation relevant 256 
information (IRI) items (see Oxburgh et al., 2012: Philips et al., 2012 for more on IRI). For 257 
example, the following response was coded as six information items, ‘Over the day I was 258 
tasked with looking at conversations 1 and other intelligence information in the human 259 
trafficking intercepts database 2. I did this to try and track down and formulate an arrest list 3 260 
for the leaders of the Zebra gang 4, the Garfunkels gang 5 and by working in collaboration 261 
with my team members, particularly the tactical investigator 6”.  262 
Responses to open questions were initially coded by a researcher naïve to the research 263 
design and hypotheses following a set of guidelines. 20% (12) of responses from each of the 264 
three questions (randomly selected) then underwent independent secondary coding. Inter-265 
rater agreement (IRA) between the coders was high for each of the open questions, r = .916 266 
(OQ1), r = .882 (OQ2) and r = .902 (OQ3).  267 
Two-way ANOVAs revealed significant main effects of group for total information 268 
items in OQ1 (individual roles) and OQ2 (individual movements), F(1, 36) = 9.485, p = .003, 269 
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13 
ηp2 = 0.22 and, F(1, 36) = 34.75, p < .001, ηp2 = 0.49, respectively. No other main effects nor 270 
interactions emerged, all ps > .071. In response to OQ1 and OQ2, insiders provided far less 271 
information than non-insiders (see Table 1).  272 
 273 
Table 1. 274 
Mean information items for each open question (OQ1, OQ2 and OQ3) as a function of group 275 
(insider; non-insider). 276 
 277 
Closed target question errors (H3). Answers to each of the questions that comprised 278 
the four clusters of closed repeated target questions were scored as correct (awarded 1) or 279 
incorrect (awarded 2) at Time 1 (first presentation) and in a similar fashion again at Time 2 280 
(second presentation) resulting in an overall target question consistency score for each 281 
participant (lower score indicates fewer errors) per cluster (see Table 2). Answers were 282 
scored as correct only if participants responded in accordance with behaviours known to 283 
match the electronic footprint and surveillance data. The maximum error score (answered 284 
incorrectly at Time 1 & 2) was 16. A score of 8 indicated respondents were correct on both 285 
occasions.  286 
 287 
Table 2. 288 
Mean target question cluster error scores a function of group (insider; non-insider) where, 289 
max. error score = 16, min. = 8. 290 
31
Insider Non-Insider
Open Question 1 0.86 (.31: 1.41) 4.30 (3.43:  5.18)
Open Question 2 1.07 (.50: 1.65) 3.85 (3.43: 4.26)
Open Question 3 .86 (.22: 1.50) 1.50 (1.11: 1.89)
M  (95% CI)
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 291 
 292 
 293 
 294 
 295 
 296 
 297 
Two-way ANOVAs revealed non-significant effects of group, team and team role and 298 
non-significant interactions for successful database access target questions, all ps > .131. 299 
Similarly, target question scores for attempted database access revealed non significant main 300 
effects and interactions, all ps > .077. A significant main effect of group (insider, non-insider) 301 
emerged for target question scores for communication behaviours, F(1, 36) = 29.268, p < 302 
.001, ηp2 = 0.45. Insider’s scored higher than non-insiders’, indicating discrepancies in 303 
responding. All other main effects and interactions were non-significant, all ps > .103. Target 304 
question scores for the cluster of movement questions revealed non-significant main effects 305 
and interactions, all ps > .168.  306 
Answer-Evidence Inconsistency (H3). Answers to closed target questions at Time 1 307 
were scored as consistent (1) or inconsistent (2) with known evidence. Scores were summed, 308 
referred to as the answer-evidence inconsistency scale, where a lower score indicates higher 309 
answer-evidence consistency. Mann-Whitney tests (data violated parametric assumptions) 310 
revealed a significant difference between insiders and non-insiders for answer-evidence 311 
inconsistency scores, U = 43.00, z = - 5.046, p < .001, r = - .084. Overall, insiders’ answer-312 
evidence inconsistency scores were higher (Mdn = 22.07) than non-insiders’ (Mdn = 15.85).  313 
Post InSort Feedback (H4).  All participants reported understanding the InSort 314 
instructions and complying with instructions. Insiders (M Insiders =1.93, 95% CI, 1.51: 2.35) 315 
Insider Non-Insider
Database Accessed 9.93 (9.07: 10.79) 9.45 (9.08: 9.88)
Database Access Attempted 10.43 (9.26: 11.60) 9.52 (9.09: 9.95)
Communication 12.36 (11.15: 13.57) 9.50 (9.05: 9.95)
Movement 8.71 (8.19: 9.24) 8.78 (8.05: 9.03)
M  (95% CI)
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reported InSort more demanding (M Non- Insiders = 3.52, 95% CI, 3.27: 3.78), F(1, 59) = 39.11, 316 
p < .001, ηp2 = 0.67, and were less confident that their answers were correct, F(1, 59) = 45.41, 317 
p < .001, ηp2 = 0.62 (M Insiders = 4.29, 95% CI, 3.52: 5.05 and M Non insiders = 2.04, 95% CI, 318 
1.74, 2.34). Insiders reported finding the questions more difficult, F(1, 59) = 7.22, p = .009, 319 
ηp2 = 0.41 (M Insiders = 1.50, 95% CI, 1.20: 1.80 and M Non insiders = 2.11, 95% CI, 1.87, 2.17). 320 
Insiders reported being dishonest when answering questions, X2 (1, 60) = 19.543, p < 321 
.001 and withholding information more often, X2 (1, 60) = 24.65, p < .001. There was no 322 
difference between insiders and non-insiders when asked whether InSort questions had been 323 
repeated, p = .634. Overall, 27 responded (45%) ‘no’, 16 (27%) were ‘unsure’ and 17 (28%) 324 
said ‘yes’. Again, no difference emerged between insiders and non-insiders as which types of 325 
questions (yes/no or text responses) had been more demanding, p = .370. Overall, 25 (42%) 326 
reported yes/no questions to be most demanding, 26 (43%) textual responses, and 9 (15%) 327 
reported all questions were equally demanding. 328 
Discussion 329 
Insider attacks are increasing in number and magnitude, with potential to undermine 330 
national and international security, cause financial loss and reputational damage (e.g., Legg, 331 
2017; Wei et al., 2021). We developed InSort, a text-based synchronous triage with potential 332 
for highlighting persons of interest after an insider incident. Insiders took twice as long to 333 
complete InSort, were less confident their answers were correct, found InSort more 334 
cognitively challenging, provided less information, and typed fewer words. Our results 335 
confirm findings of previous research in face-to-face and remote person-to-person contexts 336 
that questioning strategies which maximize cognitive burden can amplify signals of deception 337 
(e.g., Boggard et al., 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003), highlighting the potential of remote 338 
automated CMC.   339 
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Open questions increased the information harvested, eliciting an individual’s version 340 
of the truth, which can be explored for veracity (e.g., Kontogianni et al., 2020; Snook et al., 341 
2010). Tactical questioning, concerning known or verifiable information are spread 342 
throughout InSort rather than clustered at the beginning or end, which improves the veracity 343 
performance by interviewers and observers (Dando et al., 2015; Levine, 2018). We 344 
incorporated both where response time was not constrained, but where response time was 345 
monitored. Yet, although respondents could take their time, did not have to consider social 346 
context and how their answers/behaviours were received, tactical questioning again leveraged 347 
diagnostic indicators across a cohort.   348 
The remote CMC nature of InSort may have diverted impression management 349 
towards behaviours perceived by insiders as more important, hence engendering differences 350 
in the time taken to complete InSort and in the informational content in open question 351 
responses. The absence of a human questioner, and without understanding the importance of 352 
all response behaviours, some behaviours were attended to at the expense of others. 353 
Providing a coherent and consistent narrative without contradictions, with little time to 354 
prepare and where questions are not chronologically ordered, may explain the increased 355 
duration. Insider responses to open target questions were shorter, suggesting they were 356 
seeking to appear credible and cooperative, simultaneously being cautious in responding (see 357 
Sporer, 2016; Schuetzler et al., 2019; Zukerman et al., 1981). Wordy replies with low 358 
information can be indicative of deception, but not always. However, here short information 359 
poor replies were indictive of insiders, possibly being deceptive by withholding information, 360 
which is reported in face-to-face contexts (DeRosa et al., 2019; Levine, 2018)    361 
           Our findings are consistent with findings regarding the efficacy of automated 362 
screening systems for detecting deception at border crossings and in job interviews, further 363 
indicating that textual response content and response behaviours are important 364 
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(Higginbotham, 2013; Nunamaker et al., 2011; Schuetzler, et al., 2019). Our results are also 365 
consistent with cognitive load explanations of deceptive communication (Ho et al., 2016). 366 
Creation and then typing of answers to questions is complex and time consuming, but the 367 
additional demands associated with being deceptive is more time consuming still. Deceptive 368 
textual communications are shorter due to the challenges of drawing multiple responses from 369 
memory as plausible answers to questions (e.g., Burgoon et al., 2003; Pollina et al., 2017; 370 
Schuetzler et al., 2019).  371 
  Manipulative questioning includes repeat questions, which we believed could 372 
leverage notable inconsistencies between insiders and non-insiders because insiders would 373 
struggle to provide credible and consistent responses to repeat questions (H3).  Our question 374 
cluster scores alone did not generally support this hypothesis. However, one important 375 
finding was that insiders did not successfully monitor their communication behaviour and so 376 
were unable to maintain consistency. Future triage approaches might consider capturing 377 
detailed human-human remote interaction behaviours. 378 
 Although the consistency across time literature in face-to-face contexts is mixed, our 379 
findings suggest deceivers can be as consistent, sometimes more so than truthtellers (e.g., 380 
Blair et al., 2018; Clemens & Grolig, 2018; Masip et al., 2018). Conversely, answer-evidence 381 
inconsistency scores differed significantly. While insiders were consistent in textual 382 
responses, responses to target questions were inconsistent with evidence, which mirrors 383 
results in face-to-face contexts (Hartwig et al., 2006; Sukumar et al., 2018). However, here 384 
participants were aware their behaviour was monitored throughout and that movement 385 
information was collected. In face-to-face contexts participants are often unaware of 386 
information known by interviewers, which is fundamental to the success of tactical and 387 
strategic interviewing techniques (e.g., see Oleszkiewicz & Watson, 2021). Here, despite 388 
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knowing behaviour information was collected, answer-evidence inconsistency again emerges 389 
as a useful metric with potential for improving veracity decisions.  390 
Information Manipulation Theory 2 (McCornack et al., 2014: IMT2) may be relevant 391 
whereby cognitive load is related to difficulty of reasoning through the problem space created 392 
bya gap between the initial state, in our study the questions asked by InSort, and the end state 393 
(avoidance of detection).  IMT2 suggests lies are produced only when the production of the 394 
truth is problematic, and that high cognitive load is not intrinsic to deceptive discourse but 395 
depends on the potential number of solutions needed to present the version judged most 396 
appropriate. Our game was designed to mimic demands experienced by insiders in a secure 397 
environment. Hence, there were numerous narratives insiders could choose. IMT2 also 398 
proposes quantity violations such as omitting problematic discourse as a frequent form of 399 
deceptive discourse. This might explain why insiders produced fewer words.  400 
Limitations and Future Directions 401 
Our simulation embodied some features of organizations, but there are differences 402 
between it and the real world. As Taylor et al. (2013) point out the absence of a ‘world’ 403 
outside the simulation as a limitation. Employees often communicate with individuals outside 404 
their own organization, increasing the heterogeneity of communication and collaborative 405 
behaviours. Insiders were chosen at random without controlling/measuring personality, 406 
motivation, or personal circumstances, which may not tally with how insiders emerge. More 407 
complex simulations could manage these variables. We compared known insiders to co-408 
workers as a first step towards understanding if InSort might leverage differences in textual 409 
responses with reference to theories of cognitive load, information manipulation and 410 
deception. More research is required to understand how to delineate signal from noise where 411 
status is unknown. Finally, the structure of InSort is guided by the applied deception 412 
literature and so likely to remain fairly consistent. However, the informational content of 413 
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questions is dynamic. Ours was bespoke to the iCOS simulation. Constructing an event 414 
specific InSort triage depends upon the nature of tasks workers are required and allowed to 415 
do day-to-day, the information known to employers, and the insider event itself, which would 416 
guide the informational content.   417 
Conclusions 418 
Findings demonstrate the potential of real time remote investigative triage approaches 419 
such as InSort. InSort could regularly be implemented on an ad hoc basis as part of in-house 420 
security practices following operations or investigations of the nature described here. This 421 
may be useful for collating databases of response behaviours such as answer lengths and 422 
response times. Such a database may offer additional information alongside the event specific 423 
‘footprint’ allowing comparisons across incidents. InSort can be constructed and 424 
administered by non-specialists and quickly altered as required across incidents. As such, 425 
InSort has potential to expedite investigative processes.  426 
 427 
Key Points 428 
• Investigating insider attacks is challenging because of the globalisation of 429 
organisations and the fact that insiders exploit legitimate access. 430 
• The acknowledged cognitive demands associated with masking illegal insider activity 431 
offer opportunities.  432 
• Drawing on cognitive approaches to deception and understanding of deception-433 
conveying features in textual responses we developed InSort, a rapid remote computer 434 
mediated triage for highlighting persons of interest. 435 
• InSort identified persons of interest and so could add to existing insider investigative 436 
techniques following an insider attack.  437 
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• InSort may be particularly relevant given the globalisation of organisations and 438 
advancement of information technology whereby employees are dispersed across 439 
national and international sites.  440 
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Appendix A: Example InSort Questions 441 
Example open question: 442 
1. ‘Please explain what your team role entailed’ Answer via free textual response 443 
Example closed non-target questions: 444 
1. ‘What team were you assigned too?’ Answer via a forced choice (one choice allowed) 445 
drop down menu 446 
2. ‘What was your role in the team?’ Answer via a forced choice (one choice allowed) 447 
drop down menu 448 
Example closed target questions (multiple responses option): 449 
1. ‘Which databases did your team role allow you to access?’ Answer via a drop down 450 
menu allowing multiple choices 451 
2. ‘Which data bases did you access during the investigation?’ Answer via a drop down 452 
menu allowing multiple choices 453 
Example closed target questions (forced choice response): 454 
1. ‘Did you attempt to access the ‘Shared Network’ database?’ Yes/no 455 
2. Did you share your ‘Shared Network’ database password with anyone?’ Yes/no 456 
 457 
  458 
 459 
   460 
 461 
  462 
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